against each other since each got its McDonald's" (Friedman 1999: ix).
products and lower prices" (Reagan 1990: 355) . In fact, the Reaganite self-confidence and resolution in foreign policy came from a deep belief in the superiority of the American economy which he had encapsulated in the phrase "we can outspend them forever" (Gaddis 2005: 375-376) . In the specific field of promoting free trade across the globe, there was a major development during the Reagan administration: frustrated by European countries blocking global initiatives, in 1982, the administration shifted from the previous American stance of endorsing global economic liberalization to a new one that favored regional free trade agreements (Frankel 2001: 8) .
The Reagan Revolution was not a national but a worldwide phenomenon. The president himself observed that he had preached market economy in subsequent world economic forums, and year by year more people seemed convinced by this (Reagan 1990: 356) . Mrs. Thatcher had a similar outlook to Reagan's, as had President Mitterrand in France and many other leaders in developed countries. Even the Federal Republic of Germany had a slight turn to neoliberalism -up to this point, they had been the textbook example of the center-right Keynesian welfare state (Prasad 2006: 162) . Even those states, however, who did not adopt neoliberal market economics, adopted its language and used it to legitimize their own measures and policies. Neoliberal policies increasingly seemed to be the answer to all problems on earth. The U.S. for her part embarked on the promotion of neoliberal values and chose the World Bank as the key instrument for this. For some time, the World Bank was even considered as a possible substitute for an impotent and hostile U.N. (Susan Engel 2010: 55-65) . 2 Triumphalism and a firm belief in free trade were mutually reinforcing trends.
Reagan, in his 1988 State of the Union Address, mentioned that the place of the "Blame America" of the 1970s was taken by "Look up to America". He further added: "One of the greatest contributions the United States can make to the world is to promote freedom as the key to economic growth. A creative, competitive America is the answer to a changing world, not trade wars that would close doors […] " (Reagan 1988) . So the American "best practice" was not only a remedy for the economic recession and a tool to win the Cold War but also the greatest export the U.S. can trade with. The promotion of the free market was boosted by its success and the transformation it made in America.
There is one question that needs to be addressed -if not solved -with regard to the return of the divide between Neoconservative and Neoliberal economic policies. On the surface, both promote free trade and enterprise, lower tariffs and the elimination of trade barriers. It is very hard to tell the difference, but there are certainly differences in tones. The Democratic Party had the pro-market orientation of the 1980s Republicans and married that with traditional Democratic values such as concern for the environment and progressive taxation (Frankel-Orszag 2001) . Another difference is the perception of agency. For the Republicans, free trade is a value attached to people who are brave and responsible enough to compete in a world undistorted by state interventions. For the Democrats, however, economic integration is an impersonal phenomenon that would eventually prevail, with no regard to personal values or misgivings. Where the Democrats believed in the forces of globalization, Republicans believed in the importance of the political and the personal. As a contemporary editor of The National Interest saw it, "where the libertarians subscribed to the primacy of the economic and older American conservatives hankered after a primacy of culture, the neocons thoroughly believed in the 'primacy of the political'" (paraphrased by Jan Werner-Müller, CHCW [2010] III. 10). In close connection to this, one can argue that free trade and an interconnected world were teleological objectives for the Democrats, while only a tool for the Republicans.
The Carter boys and girls
The focus of this paper is on the Bill Clinton presidency but an ample outlook is needed.
The most important members of the foreign policy community under the Clinton administration had, in fact, a common experience: their training during the Carter years. There is one more, slightly connected issue that is quite a continuation between the Carter and Clinton administrations: the notion of intervention. The basic contradiction related to this was that any kind of major foreign intervention was unimaginable after the conclusion of the Vietnam War both because of domestic opposition and due to how this would affect the global image of the U.S. (Hanhimäki 2013: 105) . On the other hand, a human rights agenda required the threat of intervention as a deterrent, perhaps even more than Realpolitik. Such a duality of approach, i.e. the maintenance of the détente, and the promotion of human rights proved not only contradictory but a mere impossibility. Soviet Ambassador to Washington D.C. Anatoly Dobrinyn later recalled, "Whether Carter meant it or not, his policy was based on linking détente to the domestic situation in the Soviet Union. This represented an abrupt departure from the policy followed by the preceding administrations, inevitably making his relations with Moscow very tense" (qtd.
in Gaddis 2005: 345) . At the end of the Carter presidency, however, it looked like Carter compromised both détente and human rights (Cohen 1993: 215-217) .
On this issue, the most important persons had very different views: Brzezinski was more of an interventionist, while Cyrus Vance was less so. Carter imagined he may himself represent a synthesis between the two positions. The White House Chief of Staff summarized Carter's thinking: "Zbig would be the thinker, Cy would be the doer, and the dimension and shape of that competition is, no matter what the consequences are in terms of job losses, trade dislocations, or crushed incomes." (Clinton 1993) Further, he reaffirmed the 1982 shift in American foreign policy from FDR's trade universalism to favoring smaller, regional pacts (of which all could eventually attach later):
Too many of the chains that have hobbled us in world trade have been made in America. Our trade policy will also bypass the distracting debates over whether efforts should be multilateral, regional, bilateral, unilateral. The fact is that each of these efforts has its place. Certainly we need to seek to open other nations' markets and to establish clear and enforceable rules on which to expand trade. (Clinton 1993) The incoming 2) The world has dramatically changed. After the Cold War, personal and leadership issues are not priorities. Great changes happen because of worldwide trends, not because of resolute leadership. (See Friedman 1998: 8-15.) 3) History has a definite direction, and that is towards ever-expanding economic After some consideration, Clinton accepted the former and refused the latter, while he also blamed Bush's concept the "new world order" for the events that occurred. Against this backdrop, Clinton assigned National Security Adviser Anthony Lake to formulate a new policy with a strong and meaningful narrative, with one single catchphrase that could serve as a "compass" to foreign policy (Poppe 2010: 10, also Ambrose-Brinkley 1997).
Anthony Lake set up a task force to find that compass. There were two early versions, democratic engagement and democratic expansionism. Jeremy Rosner, a speechwriter at the National Security Council then coined the word enlargement. Rosner put this new phrase to the test with many colleagues, and having had positive feedback, told the idea to Lake who instantly liked it (Ambrose-Brinkley 1997).
In September 1993, Lake gave a speech entitled "From Containment to Enlargement" that was to formulate the new agenda. Clinton only made minor changes to the text before authorizing it (Bouchet 2015: 21).
"I see four components to the strategy of enlargement.
First, we should strengthen the community of major market democracies 5 -including our own -which constitutes the core from which enlargement is proceeding.
Second, we should help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible, especially in states of special significance and opportunity.
Third, we must counter the aggression -and support the liberalization -of states hostile to democracy and markets.
Fourth, we need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.
A host of caveats must accompany a strategy of enlargement. For one, we must be patient. As scholars observe waves of democratic advance are often followed by reverse waves of democratic setback. We must be ready for uneven progress, even outright reversals.
[…] Our strategy must view democracy broadly --it must envision a system that includes not only elections but also such features as an independent judiciary and protections of human rights." (Lake 1993) A week later, at the UN General Assembly, Clinton further stated, "During the Cold War, we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions" (qtd. in Bouchet 2015: 22).
The speech and the plan also devised priorities: first came the traditional allies in Western 
The rogue states contradiction
The framework of enlargement and engagement had certain provisions: that democratic states are less willing to fight one another, that free trade and free institutions are mutually reinforcing, the forces of globalization are on the side of further integration, and that the whole globe was set to participate in such an engagement. Naturally, not everyone was of the same opinion. The question arose: what to do with countries that are not willing to accept the fruits and benefits of globalization and engagement?
The term "backlash states" occurred already in Tony Lake's "From Containment to Enlargement" speech, but it later became somewhat transformed and was given a Vis-à-vis those countries that were unwilling to advert to democracy and the market economy, the Clinton administration upheld or even expanded trade sanctions and imposed isolation. That was the case with Cuba, where the bloqueo, the comprehensive embargo, was not lifted but was expanded in 1999. Although in the same year Clinton eased some of the sanctions against North Korea, most of them were upheld or expanded against Burma, Iran, or Iraq. These countries came to define the term rogue state. Arms embargoes were almost universal against these countries throughout the 1990s and, in fact, ever since then.
Rogue nations were no longer separable from rogue behaviors: terrorism, drugtrafficking, or human rights abuses. Rogue non-state actors were at the same time Our common efforts can produce results. [...] To take on terrorists, we maintain strong sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism and defy the rule of law, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. We ask them today again to turn from that path.
Meanwhile, we increase our own law enforcement efforts and our cooperation with other nations." (Clinton 1995) In 1997, Madeleine Albright restated with more emphasis the universal American response to those who willingly stay outside of the U.S. zone of stability and engagement:
"to strengthen the bonds among those countries that make up the growing community of major market democracies... to help emerging democracies get on their feet... to reform or isolate the rogue states... to contain the chaos and ease the suffering in the regions of greatest humanitarian concern" (qtd. in Boys 2015: 88). In this speech, one side of the coin is the evermore integrated world, and the other is the realm of rogue states that were to be either reformed or isolated.
Isolation, indeed, was sometimes considered a magic word for solving problems.
Its popularity within the administration went so far that it caused the downfall of a leader of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). In September 1996, CIA director John Deutch told Congress that economic sanctions would never be able to stop Saddam Hussein from overcoming and undermining the international order. Not soon after Deutch was dismissed, and Clinton appointed Tony Lake to the position. This was, on the other hand, a disastrous choice: Lake was considered a McGovernite, a draft-burner, and too soft on security by the Republicans, and thus unfit for the position. As Lake became the primary target of Republican criticism, he finally stepped back from nomination (AmbroseBrinkley 1997).
The most important lesson of the evolution of the rogue state doctrine was that in fact it did not entirely stop proliferation, drug-trafficking, or subversion, while it could not do a lot to improve the general situation of human rights, either. The idea that rogue nations needed to be isolated from the rest of the world is in fact contradictory to the main idea of engagement.
If engagement is "reverse domino theory" (phrasing by Brinkley 1997: 116), then isolation cannot improve but only worsen a situation. If a country choses to close up in terms of politics and economy, a remedy cannot be to place it in an international ghetto.
The latter policy might cause some unpleasant moments but would still very much be in line with the original goal of such a "rogue nation," not to mention the potential propaganda value of this kind of hostile isolation.
Conclusion
Based upon the above discussion of the evolution of the ideas of enlargement and engagement, or geoeconomics, it may be timely to present a short evaluation of both the term and its application. As for its application, most analysts agree that the Clinton administration's time was an economic success story. The wealth accumulated during this period in virtually all segments of American society is threefold. As a short-term causal factor behind this, the temporary good luck with commodity prices was decisive. In the middle run, sound macroeconomics also deserve credit as a major achievement of the Clinton team. In the long run, globalization, deregulation, innovation, and the apportioning of credit need to be mentioned (Frankel-Orszag 2001) , most of which also had an immediate connection to Clinton's policies.
On the theoretical level, one may now offer an answer as to what geoeconomics precisely means. Based on the research for this paper, it is clear that the whole concept is quite vague. It does not have axioms, and does not follow rules. There is no precise description of actions and reactions. All that can be said is that geoeconomics is the primacy of trade and the economy in global affairs, as well as a deep belief in the forces of globalization, in a world that is on the way of ever-expanding integration. For this integration, the lowering/elimination of trade barriers is essential. Thus, geoeconomics prescribes no policy solutions to crises, disputes, or disagreements, and by no means promotes trade wars -even if there have been some in the 1990s, it did not constitute a central tenet of the geoeconomics approach. Geoeconomics also did not answer the question of whether the link between free trade and democracy is structural or causal, which would have been a strong basis on which to build a more elaborate idea.
One last question to tackle is the relation of geoeconomics and democracy promotion during the Clinton administration, or in other words, whether geoeconomics (i.e. the primacy of trade) served democratization, or if democratization served geoeconomics. Judging from the rather reluctant attitude to intervention, the cost-efficient nature of foreign policy, as well as the military and political downscaling (affecting e.g. the U.S. Information Agency) throughout the world, it was arguably the democratization factor that was intended to help geoeconomics. While trade relations and economic growth were actively pursued policies during the 1990s, democratization was only supportive of these, if not an in fact passive item on Clinton's agenda. In Michael Cox's words, "promoting democracy was not a moral duty but a policy instrument to advance
American power" (paraphrased by Poppe 2010: 12).
Remembering, however, the differences between Republican and Democratic free trade ideologies, it is also clear that in the very long run, even geoeconomics may serve
democratization: an open, competitive, integrated globe was the teleological objective of Democratic trade policies.
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